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L Facts
On May 28, 1983, Andrew Smith ("Smith"), armed with a pistol and a knife,
went to the home of Christy and CorrieJohnson, ages eighty-six and eighty-two
respectively, to see if he could borrow their car. After Mr.Johnson refused, Smith
attacked Mr. and Mrs. Johnson. In the course of the attack, Smith stabbed Mr.
Johnson twenty-seven times, and he stabbed Mrs. Johnson seventeen times. In
addition to the stabbings, bothJohnsons had injuries consistentwith being struck
by a pistol. After the attack, Smith took theJohnsons' car and left the scene.'
The police arrested Smith and charged him with the murders of Mr. and Mrs.
Johnson. After waiving his Miranda rights, Smith confessed to the killings. The
State indicted Smith for two counts of murder in October of 1983, and notified
Smith of its intent to seek the death penalty. Prior to trial, the court conducted a
hearing to determine Smith's competency to stand trial. At the hearing, Dr. Joel
Sexton, a forensic pathologistwho performed autopsies on theJohnsons, testified
that most of the Johnsons' wounds and injuries were inflicted before death and
during consciousness. Additionally, a psychiatrist at the South Carolina Depart-
ment of Mental Health testified that he found Smith to be capable of assisting his
counsel and competent to stand trial. Based on this testimony and other evidence,
the trial court found Smith to be competent to stand trial.'
At trial, Smith raised an insanity defense and presented the testimony of Dr.
Helen Clark, a clinical psychologist. In response, the State introduced the testi-
mony of Dr. Spurgeon Cole, a clinical psychologist originally retained by Smith.
Cole testified that Clark misinterpreted the test results which provided the basis
for her testimony. Five days after trial commenced, the jury rejected the insanity
defense and found Smith guilty on both counts. At the conclusion of the penalty
phase, the trial court adopted the jury's recommendation of death.3
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed Smith's
convictions and death sentences.' After Smith's petition for a writ of certiorari
was rejected,' Smith filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR' in
state court. The court rejected Smith's application as to the guilt phase, but
relying on Skipper v. South Carolina,6 ordered Smith's re-sentencing.7 At the re-
1. Smith v. Moore, 137 F.3d 808,812 (4th Cir. 1998).
2. Smith, 137 F.3d at 813.
3. Id
4. State v. Smith, 334 S.E.2d 277 (S.C. 1985).
5. Smith v. South Carolina, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986).
6. 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that a defendant's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
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sentencing trial, the jury again recommended the death sentence, which the court
adopted. Smith's appeals were denied and Smith eventually filed a federal habeas
petition. A United States magistrate recommended denial of Smith's petition,
and the district court adopted this recommendation and denied Smith's petition.'
On appeal of this denial to the Fourth Circuit, Smith contended that:
(1) South Carolina's "physical torture" aggravating circumstance was unconstitu-
tional; (2) his counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain evidence in
mitigation of punishment at Smith's re-sentencing trial; (3) he was incompetent
to stand trial; (4) the state violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; (5) the
grand jury and the petit jury were selected in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (6) the trial court's instructions on expert
testimony and insanity violated the Sixth Amendment; and (7) the trial court




The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, approved denial of the
writ, finding all of Smith's claims to be without merit or procedurally barred.'"
I1. Anaylsis/Application in Virginia
A. Claim of Unconstitutionality of South Carolina's Physical Torture
Aggravating Circumstance
Smith claimed that the South Carolina "physical torture" aggravating circum-
stance" did not genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
were violated if the sentencing court refused to admit evidence of his adaptability to prison life.).
7. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986).
8. Smith, 137 F.3d at 814.
9. Id
10. For the purposes of this case note, the court's ruling on Smith's second, fifth, sixth, and
seventh contentions of error will not be discussed. The court's opinion denying these claims pro-
vides little guidance. The court's ruling on Smith's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is
worth noting.
On the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the court held that in order to find for
Smith, "Smith [would have to] show that the deficient performance of [trial counsel] prejudiced his
defense to the point that he was deprived of a fair trial." Smith, 137 F.3d at 817 (citation omitted).
The court supposedly based this ruling on the standard announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). Its interpretation of Strickland seems to require the defendant to prove, that, in
fact, he was deprived of a fair trial. However, in Strickland, the Supreme Court of the United States
went to great lengths to declare that a defendant need not actually show that it was more likely than
not that his counsel's actions deprived him of a fair trial. According to Strickland, all a defendant
has to show is that there was a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome, that counsel's errors affected the outcome of the trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. If this
is shown, then the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial; he need not actually prove anything.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit's requirement that Smith has to actually prove that he was deprived of a
fair trial is illustrative of how the court has misapplied the standard set forth in Strickland.
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(h) (Law Co-op. 1997).
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penalty because it did not require an intent to torture apart from the intent to kill.' 2
Smith's claim was based largely on the case of Godfrey v. Georgia." Under.Godfry,
to satisfy the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a state's capital sentencing
scheme must channel or limit the jury's discretion in imposing the death penalty
by statutory language which provides "clear and objective standards" that make
"rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death."' 4 The use
of aggravating factors, such as torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated assault,
is one constitutionally acceptable method of limiting jury discretion, with certain
limitations. 5 Whether an aggravating factor suitablylimits jury discretion depends
on whether it narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty such that
the sentencer cannot fairly conclude that the aggravating circumstance applies to
every capital murderer. 6 Smith argued that the South Carolina aggravating factor
of "physical torture" did not sufficiently narrow the class of persons because it did
not require an intent to torture separate from an intent to kill.
The Fourth Circuit rejected Smith's claim. The court implicitly accepted
that a separate intent to torture was needed for the physical torture aggravating
factor to be constitutional. However, the court rejected Smith's claim because the
court concluded that the South Carolina torture aggravator did require a separate
intent to torture. 17  Although South Carolina had never statutorily defined
torture, prior cases had interpreted "physical torture" to include an intent to
torture.'8 Relying on these cases, and on the trial judge's instruction to the jury
that to find torture it must find an intentional infliction of abuse before death,
the court held that the torture aggravating circumstance required a separate intent
to torture and that the jury knew about this requirement. 9 Thus, the court held,
this aggravating circumstance narrowed the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty and complied with Godfrey.2'
1. Virginia's Application of Vileness Factor is Suspect
The fact that the Fourth Circuit raised the question of the need for a
separate intent to torture brings into doubt the constitutionality of Virginia's use
12. Smith, 137 F.3d at 814.
13. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
14. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,428 (1980) (footnotes and citations omitted).
15. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (finding that "especially heinous, cruel or
depraved" aggravating factor, as construed by Arizona Supreme Court, furnishes sufficient guidance
to the sentencer to satisfy the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
16. See Zant v. Stevens, 462 U.S. 862, 876-78 (1983).
17. State v. Smith, 381 S.E.2d 724,726 (S.C. 1989).
18. Id See also State v. Elmore, 308 S.E.2d 781, 785 n.2 (S.C. 1983).
19. Smith, 137 F.3d at 814-15.
20. In Godfrey, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that Georgia had sufficiently
limited jury discretion through aggravating factors. However, the Court also held that Georgia had
failed to apply this limitation in Godfrey's case, thus his death sentence was constitutionally invalid.
Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 434.
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of the torture factor as an aggravating factor. Similar to the South Carolina
physical torture aggravating circumstance, a Virginia defendant can be sentenced
to death if he commits a murder that is "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery
to the victim."21 Virginia courts have created definitions for both the depravity
of mind and aggravated battery factors. However, unlike South Carolina, neither
the legislature of Virginia, nor its courts have even defined "torture," much less
made it clear that a separate intent to torture is required. In contrast, the Virginia
Supreme Court proceeds to determine whether torture existed by examining the
facts of each individual case on a post hoc basis as needed to uphold the finding
of the torture factor. For example, there are cases involving physical abuse
where it appears that a properly instructed jury might have inferred a separate
intent to torture. In MuMin v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of Virginia
found the existence of torture where the defendant inflicted "multiple and
grievous" wounds upon the victim prior to death.' Similarly, in Tuggle v. Common-
wealth,24 the Supreme Court of Virginia found torture where the defendant
severely beat and bit one of the victims while the victim was still alive.25 Finally,
in Stamper v. Commonwealth, 6 the court determined that torture existed where the
victim was beaten and cut before being killed.27 On the other hand, in Pqyner v.
Commonwealth,2 the Supreme Court of Virginia had to resort to a post-hoc defini-
tion of torture that included mental torture. The Virginia law lacks an intent to
torture, an element which the Fourth Circuit acknowledged as necessary, and it
lacks any instruction to the jury of such a requirement. Thus, while South
Carolina's torture aggravating circumstance may have met the requirements of
Godfrey and the line of cases following it, Virginia's torture factor does not.
These failures in application of the torture component are but another
aspect of the deficiencies in Virginia's vileness aggravator. These issues should
be raised and preserved in spite of the absence of relief from the courts to date.
Further, at trial, when the Commonwealth's evidence could not fairly raise
torture, or another component of vileness, motions in limine should be used to
strike them from the jury's consideration.
2. The Court's Reservations About Its Ruling
Smith further contended that even if the court found that the torture
aggravating circumstance required an intent to torture, there was not enough
21. VA CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1998).
22. 389 S.E.2d 886 (Va. 1990).
23. Mu'Min v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 886, 896-97 (Va. 1990).
24. 323 S.E.2d 539 (Va. 1984), vacated on othergrounds, 471 U.S. 1096 (1985).
25. Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 539, 553 (Va. 1984).
26. 257 S.E.2d 808 (Va. 1979).
27. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 808, 819-20 (Va. 1979).
28. 329 S.E.2d 815 (Va. 1985).
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evidence to support a finding of such an intent.9 The court found the evidence
sufficient to support the torture aggravator. For some reason, however the
court undertook a lengthy harmless error analysis on the possibility that the
factor had been erroneously applied.3"
The court noted the other aggravating factors found by the jury, namely that
Smith committed the murders while in the commission of a felony.3 The court
ruled that in a non-weighing state,32 if a jury finds at least one other valid aggravat-
ing factor, then the jury's reliance on an invalid aggravating factor may be harmless
error if it satisfies the test announced in Tuggle v. Netherland.33 However, under
Stringer v. Black,' the Supreme Court of the United States assumed that the
determination of harmless error, even in a non-weighing state, is to be done by the
state appellate court, and not by a federal court.3 The Fourth Circuit ruled that
South Carolina is a non-weighing state, and that under Tuggle, any error which
would have resulted from use of an invalid aggravating factor was harmless.
36
This departure from principles of comity and federalism may be explained by the
fact that the court did not concede that the factor had been improperly applied.
It might be wise for appellate counsel, however, to request remand to the state
courts in the event the court finds an aggravating circumstance to be invalid.
B. Incompetence to Stand Trial
Smith claimed that he was incompetent to stand trial because he was taking
the drug Mellaril.3 At trial, Smith had contended that he would be incompetent
if he were taken off of Mellaril 8 Smith was taken off of Mellaril at trial and no
29. Smith, 137 F.3d. at 815.
30. Id at 815-17.
31. Id at 815.
32. A non-weighing state is one whose procedures do not explicitly require the sentencer to
formally balance aggravating factors against mitigating factors. Virginia is formally a non-weighing
state. In practice, of course, Virginia is a weighing state. Because proof of one statutory aggravating
factor is a prerequisite of death eligibility and mitigating evidence must be considered before the
jury imposes a sentence of either death or life in prison, "weighing" necessarily takes place.
33. 79 F.3d 1386 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 237 (1996). In Tuggk, the court held
that factors to be examined in determining if use of an invalid aggravator was harmless error or not
include:
(1) the strength of the remaining aggravating circumstance; (2) the evidence admitted
... at the sentencing hearing to establish the invalid aggravating circumstance; (3) the
evidence improperly excluded at the sentencing hearing; (4) the nature of any mitigat-
ing evidence; (5) the dosing argument of the prosecutor; and (6) any indication that the
jury was hesitant or entertained doubt in reaching its sentencing determination.
Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386, 1393 (4th Cir. 1996).
34. 503 U.S. 222 (1992).
35. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1992).
36. Smith, 137 F.3d at 816-817.




psychoses appeared. 9 As a result, Smith did not raise the issue of incompetence
on direct appeal, and he did not raise the issue in his first PCR application.4 °
Rather, defense counsel raised the issue in Smith's second PCR application; where
the state PCR judge dismissed the claim as procedurally defaulted.4 The United
States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, ruled that, because Smith did not prop-
erly present the claim in state court, Smith was procedurally barred from raising
the claim at federal habeas review.42 However, Smith argued that under Pate v.
Robinson43 and Drope v. Missouri" competence to stand trial can never be waived.
The court ruled against Smith's claim. According to the court, Pate and
Drope stood only for the proposition that an incompetent defendant cannot
knowingly or intelligently waive his rights.4" The court held that waiver had no
bearing on the procedural default of this issue. Accordingly, the court concluded
that a claim of incompetency to stand trial "asserted for the first time in a federal
habeas petition is subject to procedural default."
'46
However, Pate and Drope arguably stand for more than simply the proposi-
tion that an incompetent defendant cannot knowingly or intelligently waive his
rights. In Drope, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that "we have
expressed doubt that the right to further inquiry upon the question [of compe-
tence to stand trial] can be waived. 4 7 It is quite plausible to read Drope as
declaring that the right to raise the issue of competency to stand trial can never
be waived. In Bundy v. Dugger,4 the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Circuit, held that "a defendant can challenge his competency to stand trial for the
first time in his initial habeas petition."49 However, the court in Smith ruled that
there is a difference between waiver and default, and thus waiver of such a claim
was inapposite to the Smith situation.
A practical problem related to the competency issue can arise from the
procedure used to examine competency to stand trial in Virginia. According to
section 19.2-169.1 of the Virginia Code, a defendant may have his competency
to stand trial determined by a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, or a master's level
psychologist."0 The evaluator provides the court and the attorneys of record with
39. Id
40. Smith, 137 F.3d at 818.
41. Id
42. Id
43. 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (holding that conviction of an incompetent defendant violates due
process).
44. 420 U.S. 162 (1975) (noting that competency is essential to a fair trial).
45. Smith, 137 F.3d at 818.
46. Id at 819.
47. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 176-77 (1975).
48. 816 F.2d 564 (11th Cir. 1987).
49. Bundy v. Dugger, 816 F.2d 564, 567 (11th Cir. 1987).
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1(A) (Michie 1998).
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a report on the defendant's competency. The report must include a determina-
tion of: (1) the defendant's capacity to understand the proceedings against him;
(2) the defendant's ability to assist his attorney; and (3) the defendant's need for
treatment in the event he is found incompetent."s After the court receives the
report, it may decide whether the defendant is competent or not. At that time,
the prosecutor or the defense attorney may request a hearing on the defendant's
competency, or the court may require a hearing if it has reasonable cause to
believe the defendant will be hospitalized.
2
Two warning signs for defense counsel arise from the fact that competency
is an issue that is of interest to both parties and the court, while sanity and
mitigation are adversary issues. First, defense counsel should ensure that the
competency evaluation and the court's related order cover only the question of
competency, and not questions of insanity or mental mitigation. By limiting the
scope of the evaluation and the accompanying order, defense counsel can ensure
that no prejudicial information or unauthorized discovery is revealed to the
Commonwealth or the court. Second, if a competency hearing is ordered, when
presenting evidence either for or against competency, it is important not to allow
testimony of psychologists or other witnesses to go beyond the issue of compe-
tency. Questions should be limited to those which will only answer the question
of competency and which will not inadvertently disclose any defenses based on
insanity or any mental mitigation evidence. Failure to ask questions at a compe-
tency hearing directed strictly to competency, may allow the prosecutor to obtain
free discovery of key information.
C. Violation of Sixth Amendment Right By Commonwealth Calling
Pychologist Originaly Retained by the Defense
Smith contended that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel was violated when Dr. Cole, originally retained by Smith, testified on
behalf of the Commonwealth that Smith was not insane." This claim was not
decided on the merits. According to Smith, the attorney-client privilege pro-
tected Dr. Cole's testimony.' The court held that Smith's claim would have
required the court to find that the Sixth Amendment is violated when the state
calls a defense-related psychiatrist as a rebuttal witness.55 According to the court,
this rule would have been new, and as a result, subject to Teague v. Lane.6 The
court also noted, however, that violation of Smith's attorney-client privilege
51. VA. CODE ANN. 19.2-169.1(D) (Michie 1998).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1(E) (Michie 1998).
53. Smith, 137 F.3d at 819.
54. Id at 819.
55. Id at 820.
56. 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (holding a rule is new and cannot be a basis for disturbing a
death sentence if "the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final); See also Case Summary of O'De/, CAP. DEF. J., Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 4.
1998]
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would not have been a violation of Smith's Sixth Amendment constitutional
rights.5 7 It is this latter conclusion that is highly questionable. Defense counsel
should steadily maintain that the attorney-client privilege is an integral and
necessary component of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel. On the merits of the issue, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court of the
United States would agree with the Fourth Circuit.
Perhaps the best course of action, however, is to avoid this situation com-
pletely. One way might be to contractually obligate defense experts, retained or
appointed, not to assist the prosecution.
Jason J. Solomon
57. Smith, 137 F.3d at 819.
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